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ARGUMENT 
I. The term "minor child55 can reasonably be interpreted to include unborn 
children. 
Defendant cites to various dictionaries to help clarify the meaning of the term "minor 
child", including Black's Law Dictionary which defines "child" as "1 . A person under the 
age of majority... 5. A baby or fetus." 254 (8th ed. 2004). Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary 
defines a "minor" as "A person who has not reached full legal age; a child or juvenile." 1017. 
Therefore, using Black's definitions of both "minor" and "child", a "minor child" may be 
defined as a child who has not reached full legal age, which could include and unborn child 
where"child" is defined as a "baby or fetus." Applying this logic to Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-
1 (2009 Repl.) which states that the "period of minority extends in males and females to the 
age of eighteen years . . . " one reasonable conclusion is that any person that is not eighteen 
or older may be considered a minor child, including an unborn child. 
Of course, while helpful, the above definitions, and those additional definitions cited 
by Defendant, are not controlling upon this Court in determining the intent of the Utah 
legislature with respect to Utah Code Ann. §78-11-6. 
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II. Utah caselaw does not exclude an unborn child from the definition of a "minor 
child" with respect to a wrongful death claim. 
Defendant relies on two Utah cases to support its proposition that the definition of the 
term "minor child" cannot include an unborn child. 
The first is Alternative Options & Servs. for Children v. Chapman, 106 P.3d 749 (UT 
App. 2004), a Utah Appellate Court decision, in which the court was asked to determine if 
unborn children come under the purview of the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children 
(ICPC). 106 P.3d 744 (Utah App.) The Court ruled that unborn children are not regulated 
by the ICPC. Id. at 752. This was a narrow decision limited to the ICPC and cannot properly 
be used to determine whether a wrongful death claim can arise frorn the death of an unborn 
child. Furthermore, the court's holding in Chapman does not stand for the proposition that 
the definition of "child" in Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701 could not include unborn children 
only that it "does not specifically include unborn children.5' Id. at 752, n.8. Furthermore, the 
court in Chapman, in reaching its decision, applied a test of "parental. . . control" upon an 
unborn child as a basis for not extending ICPC regulation to the unborn. Id. Clearly, analysis 
of parental control is not applicable to the present case. 
The second case is Alma Evans Trucking v. Roach, 714 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1986). In 
Roach, Isaac Robertson was killed in a trucking accident about three weeks before his child, 
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Heather, was born. Id. at 1148. The trucking company sought review of the Industrial 
Commission's decision to award death benefits to the unborn child from the time of her 
father's death as opposed to the time of her birth. Id. The court ruled that the relevant 
workers compensation statute provided for death benefits for a "posthumous child." Id. The 
court farther ruled that "by its very definition a posthumous child is not a posthumous child 
until it is bom." Id. The court held that workers compensation death benefits should be 
triggered by the birth of the child and not by the death of the child's father. Id. at 1149. 
This case is distinguishable from present case is several ways. First, it is narrow in 
that it is limited to an analysis of workers compensation benefits. Second, the Court in 
Roach was interpreting a term, "posthumous child", that can only have one meaning. 
Specifically, as the court noted, the term "posthumous child" is, quite simply, a child that is 
bom after his parent dies. Id. at 1148. There is no other competing definition for the term 
"posthumous child." 
One of the purposes of workers compensation death benefits is to provide some 
support for the deceased's children. Therefore, it seems clear that a child would have to be 
alive to enjoy the intended workers compensation benefits resulting from his or her parent's 
death. As such, the court's ruling in Roach does not violate the Legislature's stated intention 
to provide protection to the rights of the unborn because a child can only benefit from 
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workers compensation awards if he or she is born alive. 
On the other hand, the purpose of third party wrongful death actions is to discourage 
the negligent killing of others, hold accountable those individuals whose negligent acts lead 
to the deaths of others, and to provide relief to the families of individuals killed by the 
negligence of others. In the present case, the court must decide whether the death of unborn 
child could give rise to a cause of action by his statutory heirs as opposed to in Roach where 
the court had to decide whether an unborn child could be deemed a beneficiary of benefits 
triggered by the death of another. In the present case, the Plaintiffs deceased child, like any 
victim of a wrongful death, will never be the beneficiary of any claim. 
For the foregoing reasons, neither the holding in Chapman or Roach is controlling on 
the issue now before the court. 
III. Because there is no controlling definition of a minor child in Utah law and 
because the term may reasonably be defined in more than one way the court may 
properly consider relevant policy considerations in determining the intent of the 
legislature. 
As previously set forth in Plaintiffs initial brief the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
"a statute is ambiguous 'if the terms used . . . may be understood to have two or more 
plausible meanings.'5' R&R Industrial Park L.L.C. v. The Utah Property and Casualty 
Insurance Guaranty Assoc. 199 P.3d917,923 (Utah 2008) (internal citations omitted). Once 
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a statute is deemed to be ambiguous the court may then "use extrinsic interpretive tools such 
as policy and legislative intent to guide [its] analysis." Id-
Other courts have applied policy analysis when defining the term "minor child" to 
include the unborn. In Moen v. Hansen, 527 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975), the Washington 
Supreme Court held that denial " of recovery to an unborn child tortiously killed, on the 
arbitrary grounds that the child did not survive the tort long enough to be born alive, is 
eminently illogical." 527 P.2d 266, 268 (1975). In reaching that conclusion the court: 
[Pjosed a hypothetical example involving twins injured simultaneously 
[where]one [was] born alive and one [was] stillborn... . [T]o allow recovery 
for only one of the twin victims is logically indefensible. It would be 
inconsistent to say that the child must first draw breath, then expire, 
in order to confer upon its parents a right of action for its death. We thus 
reject birth as the demarcation. 
Id. (Internal quotations omitted) 
In the present case, Plaintiffs have alleged that their child, at the fortieth week of 
gestation, died because he was post mature, meaning that the negligent act was one of failing 
to timely and safely procure his birth. In this case, the tortious act of allowing the child to 
remain in the womb too long should not logically and morally be available now as a defense 
for the act itself. 
Therefore, given the ambiguous language of Utah Code Ann. §78-11-6 and the Utah 
Legislature's stated commitment to protecting the unborn, this court should adopt the 
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reasoning ofMoen v. Hansen and interpret the term "minor child" to include the unborn. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs request that the Court answer the question 
of law certified by the United States District Court as follows: Utah's wrongful death statute 
creates a cause of action for the wrongful death of an unborn child. 
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2010. 
FLICKINGER & SU^TERFIELD 
Brett R. Boulton 
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